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Introduction 
Stories about nonhuman animals continue to 
fascinate us as they have since Aristotle. A phrase 
recently employed in a moral philosophical account of 
animals. "animals matter," can also be applied to animal 
stories-they matter too. For our accounts of animals 
are a powerful influence on our attitudes toward and 
practices involving animals. 
Of course, all animal stories are accounts both of 
animals and, whether explicitly or only implicitly, of 
their storytellers. The authors of this set of 21 essays 
are biologists, philosophers, and psychologists who 
share a common concern with "a revival of interest in 
the study ofanimal minds" (p. xx) [all references are to 
the book under review unless otherwise indicated]. They 
discuss a host of questions centering on whether there 
can be a science of animal minds, what it might look 
like, and what its methods and rules of evidence can 
be. Their attempts to answer these and other questions 
in the philosophy of science result in these conceptually 
dense but nonetheless engaging stories about animals, 
science, and scientists. 
The present essay attempts a cohesive reading of 
the varied perspectives found in the collection. It is itself 
an animal story, although one thrice removed from a 
direct narrative about animals. It is necessarily a 
commentary on accounts in the philosophy of science 
regarding animal behavior scientists' studies, them­
selves accounts of animals. In fairness to the editors 
and authors of this fme anthology, before I tell that story 
let me locate myself as a storyteller. 
I am interested in the ethics of relations "between 
the species," more particularly between human and 
nonhuman animals, and most particularly between 
scientists and educators and their nonhuman "subjects." 
What will be the results of this revival of interest in 
animal minds on the treatment of animals in science? 
How will it affect the numbers of animals used, the 
conditions under which they are housed, the degree of 
invasiveness of their treatment? . 
My own position on the ethics and scientific merit 
of animal research leads me to favor a significant 
reduction in the numbers of animals used in research, 
notably when they are used as models of complex 
human phenomena. I also am critical of the use of a lab 
setting and, specifically, of the caging of animals of 
most species (Shapiro, 1989), preferring a style of 
research and education which can be conducted in 
naturalistic or seminaturalistic settings. On ethical, 
scientific validity and pedagogical grounds, I also favor 
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research and educational approaches that feature 
relatively nonmanipulative and noninvasive data­
gathering methods. My position is that we will always 
study animals where they are and how we are. The only 
legitimate question in the current debate is whether we 
will continue to have a science that believes it must or 
should alxJ:uct, produce, anddeform animals to study them. 
In addition to the direct and concrete effects of this 
evolving research development, I am also concerned 
with its influence on society's attitudes and practices 
involving animals. Both the practices ofanimal behavior 
science, the ways in which laboratory animals are 
actually treated, and the research results, the descriptions 
of the capabilities, sensibilities and needs of animals, 
have a considerable impact on how we as a society are 
educated both formally and informally to think about 
and treat animals. 
I will address the former, more concrete concerns 
briefly-for I can only offer some impressions, mostly 
from my own field of psychology. 
There are several sub fields within psychology which 
utilize animals in research. Judging by the trend in the 
number of doctorate degrees granted annually, 
experimental (including behavioristic psychology), 
comparative and physiological psychology all have 
declined in recent years (American Psychological 
Association Monitor, May 1987). This trend may 
indicate a decline in the number of animals used in 
these subfields. There is also some evidence of a 
decline in the degree of invasiveness (suffering, injury, 
harm) in psychological experimentation, although the 
evidence is mixed (Field, 1988). However, much highly 
invasive research continues to be conducted (Field, 
1990), particularly in physiological psychology and 
neuroscience and by politically prominent psychologists 
(Shapiro, Field and Carr, 1990). Most research involving 
animals is lab-based, although a small proportion of 
comparative psychology involves field work 
(Dewsbury, 1984). 
In psychology, the return to the study of the mental 
life of animals is part of the shift which began as early 
as the mid-1950's from a behavioristic to a cognitive 
psychology. In biology, an analogous and more recent 
shift is underway from classical ethology to a cognitive 
ethology. It is difficult to judge the role of these shifts 
in the trends just indicated or in future trends. However, 
a reading of the studies cited in the two of the four 
sections in the volume under review that deal 
relatively more directly with actual research than with 
philosophical issues ("Recognition, choice, and play" 
and "Communication and language") is at least 
suggestive. Most of the studies cited on recognition and 
choice are field rather than lab research, most of them 
involve invertebrates, and most are relatively 
noninvasive. Studies cited on communication and 
language include more lab-based but still relatively 
noninvasive research. On the other side, these latter 
studies rely heavily on the use ofprimates. Further, there 
are occasional references throughout the volume to 
invasive lab research: spinal cats, rats killing mice in 
lab enclosures, and isolation-reared monkeys. 
We tum now to the possible impacts of the scientific 
interest in animals' minds on society's treatment of 
animals. This will require an analysis of a number of 
philosophical issues for, as the editors point out, "What 
we do in our analyses of animal behavior, how we do 
it, and how information is interpreted, explained and 
disseminated all hang together" (p. xxi). 
Cognitivism 
The shift in both psychology and biology to the "re­
minding" of animals is called cognitivism. Both 
behavioristic psychology and classical ethology denied 
or avoided attributing a mental life to animals. Radical 
behaviorism's concepts of stimulus, response and 
reinforcement purposely excluded purpose, intention 
and subjectivity, Classical ethology's concepts of 
instinct, releasers, and ftxed action pattern also avoided 
mentalist talk of expectation and emotional life. By 
using metaphors borrowed from mechanics and 
hydraulics, both avoided casting animals in a human 
shape. As a result, the characters in their animal stories 
tended to be mechanomorphs. Governed by simple 
mechanisms, they are beings without subjectivity, 
without a consciously experienced or lived world. 
The choice of this physicalistic explanatory style is 
"[hung] together," at least in the case of behaviorism, 
with an experimental method featuring quantifiable 
stimuli and responses and, typically, a subject matter 
that suggested rather limited cognitive sophistication 
in the animals under study. This general approach is 
largely intelligible in terms of the attempts of these 
incipient behavioral sciences to emulate the positivism 
of the regnant 19th century physical sciences. 
With the advent ofcognitivism, there is increasingly 
an openness to locate and study a more sophisticated 
subject matter. Further, whether "communicative 
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pretend play" or "habitat choice" or "kin recognition," 
these phenomena are no longer explained or explained 
away in behaviorist talk ofsimple forms of associative 
learning or adaptationist talk of the workings ofnatural 
selection on evolving genotypes. 
As the predominant discourse in this volume, 
cognitivism invokes the metaphor of information. 
Animals gather, select, encode, store, retrieve and, in 
a word, process information. For example, here is 
Smith on communication in animals: "Communication 
cannot be understood without taking into account the 
mental operations that integrate information from 
many sources" (p. 234). "[The individual] appears 
actively to organize and store acquired knowledge to 
provide an essential foundation of information for its 
continuous anticipation of circumstances. The 
mechanisms ofits operations are the focus ofcognitive 
research (p. 234, emphases added)." This discourse 
derives partly from computer science and partly from 
the attempt to understand, simulate and even create 
human intelligence artificially through computer 
hardware and software. Applied to the study of 
animals' minds, at first glance it is a cryptomechano­
morphism which merely replaces Cartesian pulleys 
with cybernetic feedback loops. 
Indeed, the processing of information is often 
couched in a kind of machine talk. But as we will 
describe following Dennett (1983) and as the 
emphasized terms quoted above show, as often this talk 
is mixed with intentionalistic discourse. An individual 
animal (and sometimes his or her mental structure itselt) 
is said to anticipate, predict or plan. Further, in addition 
to or at the center of the working out of the "mechanics" 
of cognitive processing is a concept of representation. 
Talk of the forms by which information is represented 
in an animal's mind quickly overextends most 
metaphors of mechanics. It is typically replaced by the 
language of language: Information is represented in the 
linguistic form of propositions or rules. (Minority 
positions are that the mode ofrepresentation is imagistic 
[Shepard and Cooper, 1982] or even bodily [Shapiro, 
1990] rather than linguistic). 
Once granting the capacity of representation, further 
sophisticated attributes of the mental life of animals 
readily follow. Ifanimals process and store information 
that represents the world, then their mental life bas 
"intentionality," in the broad philosophical sense ofthat 
term as being about (intending) things in the world. To 
say that animals have intentions about the world and 
act on them is to say that they have concepts and beliefs. 
(However, Davidson, as against Dennett, takes the 
position that belief possession requires full-blown 
linguistic capacity [Dupre, p. 440] lacking in animals.) 
And if first order intention (beliefs, desires about 
things), why not second order intention (beliefs, desires 
about another animal's beliefs, desires) or even third 
order intention (Mitchell, p. 208)? In fact, as these 
investigators think through certain sophisticated 
phenomena for us, we see that almost by definition play 
and genuine communication involve intentional sharing, 
influence, and involvement among individuals. 
It is partly in this context that Dennett offers his 
suggestion that those studying animal behavior adopt 
the everyday intentionalist language of beliefs, desires 
and intentions in place both of "behaviorese" and 
cognitivist talk of information processing (Dennett, 
1983, p. 343). Of course, Dennett would have 
investigators hedge their bet, in that the recommended 
intentional stance denotes only a .commitment to an 
explanatory style that works (is predictive). It does not 
imply any commitment to an ontological position which 
holds that animals are in fact intentional beings. 
With these attributions of information processing, 
representation, intention, belief and concept, the shared 
concern among these thoughtful investigators is not 
letting in a modernized version of mechanomorphism. 
Their concern is with that old specter anthropo­
morphism. As Fisher (p. 115) suggests, the charge of 
anthropomorphism is overapplied, being based on an 
overinclusive understanding of the term. The term 
should be limited to the attribution "of exclusively 
human characteristics to animals" (Noske, 1990, p. 62). 
It refers to that class oferrors that give animals a human 
form they do not in fact share with us. 
Of course, some concern with anthropomorphism 
is a necessary safeguard against a popular culture which 
humanizes all manner of nonhuman animals. Some of 
it also is part of the "healthy skepticism" (Galef, p. 91) 
of a scientific process that is careful not to distort and, 
in particular, not to inflate either the description or 
explanation of the object of study. Associated with the 
constructive side of a positivistic approach to science, 
this critique is evident in a number ofthe present essays. 
For example, against claims that certain species of 
animals transmit behavior through complex forms of 
intergenerational social behavior which is then 
appropriately termed "tradition," Galef argues that 
"simple acquisition processes" (p. 91), such as direct 
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r e i n f o r c e m e n t ,  c a n  a c c o u n t  f o r  t h e s e  s o - c a l l e d  
t r a d i t i o n a l  b e h a v i o r s .  
H o w e v e r ,  m u c h  o f  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  o v e r - a p p l i c a t i o n  
o f t h e  c h a r g e  o f a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m  a g a i n s t  r e s e a r c h  i n t o  
a n i m a l s '  m i n d s  r e f l e c t s  a  p o s i t i v i s t i c  p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  
v a l i d i t y  a n d  o t h e r  v e s t i g e s  o f  t h e  C a r t e s i a n  u n d e r ­
p i n n i n g s  o f p o s i t i v i s t i c  s c i e n c e .  T o  v a r y i n g  d e g r e e s  t h e  
p r e s e n t  a u t h o r s  h a v e  a s s i m i l a t e d  t h e  n u m e r o u s  c r i t i q u e s  
o f p o s i t i v i s m  f r o m  b o t h  w i t h i n  a n d  w i t h o u t  t h e  n a t u r a l  
s c i e n t i f i c  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  ( S h a p i r o ,  1 9 8 6 ) .  I n  p r a c t i c e ,  t h i s  
m e a n s  t h a t  t h e y  a c c e p t  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  o f  t h e i r  e m p i r i c a l  
i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  c a n n o t  a c h i e v e  c e r t a i n t y .  T h e y  r e c o g n i z e  
t h a t ,  a s  i n v e s t i g a t o r s ,  t h e y  a r e  e m b e d d e d  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  
c o n c e r n s ,  l a n g u a g e  h a b i t s  ( s u c h  a s  t h o s e  i m p l i e d  b y  
F e n t r e s s  [ p p .  7 - 3 5 ]  i n  t h e  s e l e c t i o n  o f  c a t e g o r i e s  t o  
d e s c r i b e  b e h a v i o r ) ,  a n d  c u l t u r a l  b i a s e s  ( s u c h  a s  t h a t  
d e s c r i b e d  b y  G r u e n  [ p p .  5 6 - 7 4 ]  a s  g e n d e r e d  k n o w l e d g e ) ,  
a l l  o f  w h i c h  p r e v e n t  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  t r a n s p a r e n t  a n d  
u n i v e r s a l  t r u t h  c l a i m e d  p o s s i b l e  b y  p o s i t i v i s t i c  l i g h t s .  
H o w e v e r ,  i n  m y  v i e w  m a n y  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  
c o n t r i b u t o r s  s t i l l  h a r b o r  r e m n a n t s  o f  p o s i t i v i s m  a n d  
C a r t e s i a n i s m .  T h i s  r e s u l t s  i n  o v e r l y  s u s p i c i o u s  a n d  r i g i d  
c o n c e r n s  a b o u t  p r o v i d i n g  a n  i n f l a t e d  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  
t h e i r  o w n  o r  o t h e r  r e s e a r c h e r s '  r e s u l t s .  T h e s e  c o n c e r n s  
a r e  o f t e n  c o u c h e d  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  c h a r g e  o f  a n t h r o p o ­
m o r p h i s m .  F o r  e x a m p l e ,  b e y o n d  t h e  o b l i g a t o r y  n o d  t o  
M o r g a n ' s  C a n o n ,  t h a t  t h e  c o n t r i b u t o r s  a r e  s t i l l  m o r e  
c o m f o r t a b l e  w i t h  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  w h i c h  r e d u c e s  a n y  
a p p a r e n t  i n d i c a t i o n  o f  a n  a n i m a l ' s  m e n t a l  l i f e  t o  s o m e  
f o r m  o f  m e c h a n i s t i c  f r i c t i o n  p o i n t s  t o  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  
p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  C a r t e s i a n  o r t h o d o x y  t h a t  o n l y  h u m a n s  
h a v e  a  m e n t a l  l i f e .  
M o r e  s u b t l y  a n d  m o r e  p e r v a s i v e l y ,  t h e y  s t i l l  
c o n c e i v e  o f  t h e  m e n t a l ,  w h e t h e r  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  h u m a n  o r  
a n i m a l ,  a s  t h a t  d o u b l y  u n o b s e r v a b l e  C a r t e s i a n  
" n o n s t u f f . "  T h e  m i n d f u l  i s  b o t h  i r r e t r i e v a b l y  i n s i d e  
t h e  b o d y  a n d  n o t  o f  t h e  b o d y ,  b e i n g  p r e c i s e l y  " m e n t a l , "  
d i s e m b o d i e d ,  i n c o r p o r e a l .  G i v e n  t h i s  r a d i c a l  i n a c c e s ­
s i b i l i t y  t h a t  i s  t h e  h a l l m a r k  o f  t h e  C a r t e s i a n  i s o l a t e d  
e g o  ( D u p r e ,  p p .  4 2 8 - 4 3 4 ) ,  w e  c a n  o n l y  k n o w  a n o t h e r ' s  
i n t e n t i o n s  ( w h e t h e r  t h a t  o t h e r  i s  h u m a n  o r  a n i m a l )  b y  
i n f e r e n c e .  S o  m u c h  f o r  g e n u i n e  i n t i m a c y .  M o r e  
p e r t i n e n t l y  h e r e ,  t h i s  s t r o n g l y  h e l d  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n  i s  
a n  a p o l o g y  f o r  t h e  c o g n i t i v i s t ,  h a v i n g  l e t  g o  o f  
b e h a v i o r i s m ' s  i m p r e s s i v e l y  l i m i t e d  c o n c e p t u a l  u n i v e r s e ,  
t o  r e t a i n  a t  l e a s t  a  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  b e h a v i o r i s m .  T h e  
m e n t a l  i s  o n l y  k n o w n  b y  i n f e r e n c e  f r o m  b e h a v i o r  
w h e r e  b e h a v i o r  i s  c o n c e i v e d  i n  p h y s i c a l i s t i c  a n d  
i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t i c  t e r m s .  R a t h e r  t h a n  i m m e d i a t e l y  g i v e n  
a s  m e a n i n g f u l ,  a s  a n  e m b o d i e d  c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  a c t i o n  
i s  o n l y  k n o w n  b y  i n f e r e n c e .  ( D u p r e  [ p .  4 3 8 ]  m a k e s  a  
s i m i l a r  a r g u m e n t  i n  W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n  t e r m s ,  r a t h e r  t h a n  
i n  t h e  p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l  t e r m s  I  u s e  h e r e . )  W e  d o  n o t  
s e e  a n  a n i m a l  r e t r e a t i n g  i n  o r  a s  h i s  o r  h e r  p o s t u r e  a n d  
m o v e m e n t ;  w e  o n l y  i n f e r  h i s  o r h e r  r e t r e a t  a f t e r  t h e  f a c t  
o f  t h e  l e a v e - t a k i n g .  I n  o t h e r  w o r d s ,  d e s p i t e  w h a t  i s  n o  
d o u b t  t h e  i n t i m a t e  s e n s e  a n d  k n o w l e d g e  t h e s e  a u t h o r s  
h a v e  o f  t h e i r  a n i m a l  s u b j e c t s ,  t h e y  w i l l  n o t  s p e a k  f r o m  
t h a t .  T h e y  d i s q u a l i f y  t h e  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  g a i n e d  f r o m  
t h e i r  o w n  h a r d · e a r n e d  a t t e m p t s  t o  e m p a t h i z e ,  
p a r t i c i p a t e ,  a n d  b e  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  a n i m a l s .  
A  n u m b e r  o f  t h e  a u t h o r s  h e r e  d o  g r a p p l e  w i t h  t h e s e  
i s s u e s .  I n  m y  v i e w ,  C l a r k  i n  t h e o r y  a n d  M i t c h e l l  i n  
p r a c t i c e  c l e a r l y  o v e r c o m e  t h e  C a r t e s i a n  l e g a c y .  D u p r e  
a t  l e a s t  h e d g e s  t h e  b e t  b y  a r g u i n g  f o r  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  
D e n n e t t ' s  r e c o m m e n d e d  i n t e n t i o n a l  s t a n c e .  
T h i s  e m e r g i n g  c o g n i t i v e  e t h o l o g y  i s  a  m i x  o f  n e o ­
K a n t i a n i s m ,  c o m p u t e r  s c i e n c e  a n d  m e t h o d o l o g i c a l  
b e h a v i o r i s m .  A s  s u c h ,  i n  m y  v i e w  i t  m a y  n o t  b e  a n  
e n t e r p r i s e  w i t h  a  s t a b l e  f u t u r e .  I t  w i l l  l i k e l y  c r y s t a l l i z e  
i n t o  a  r e d u c t i v e  p h y s i o l o g i c a l  d i s c o u r s e  o n  t h e  o n e  s i d e  
a n d  a n  i n t e r p r e t i v e  s c i e n c e  o n  t h e  o t h e r .  U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  
i n  m y  v i e w ,  t h i s  l a t t e r  w i l l  n o t  b e  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  m o s t  
c u r r e n t  i n v e s t i g a t o r s  a n d  w i l l  n o t  b e  g i v e n  a n y  s t a n d i n g  
e i t h e r  i n  b i o l o g y  o r p s y c h o l o g y .  B y  i n t e r p r e t i v e  s c i e n c e ,  
I  m e a n  s o m e t h i n g  c l o s e  t o  a n  " a n t h r o p o l o g y , "  i f  y o u  
w i l l ,  o f  n o n h u m a n  a n i m a l s .  I n  t h i s  s c i e n c e  a s  i n  
a n t h r o p o l o g y ,  t h e  o b j e c t s  o f  s t u d y  a r e  n o t  u p r o o t e d  o r  
m a n i p u l a t e d .  T h e y  a r e  s t u d i e d  w h e r e  t h e y  a r e  a n d  h o w  
t h e y  a r e .  F u r t h e r ,  i n  t h i s  e n t e r p r i s e ,  i t  i s  r e c o g n i z e d  t h a t  
u n d e r s t a n d i n g  i s  g a i n e d  b y  a n  e m p a t h i c  a n d ,  w h e r e  
p o s s i b l e ,  a  p a r t i c i p a t o r y  o b s e r v a t i o n  a n d  t h a t  i t  c o n s i s t s  
i n  a  c o h e s i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  l i v e s  a s  t h e y  a r e  
l i v e d  b y  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  s t u d i e d .  
" A w a k e n i n g "  A n i m a l s  
T h i s  b r i n g s  m e  t o  a  f u r t h e r  c r i t i c i s m  o f c o g n i t i v i s m ,  
o n e  t h a t  I  a m  p a r t i c u l a r l y  s e n s i t i v e  t o  a s  a  p h e n o m e ­
n o l o g i s t .  T h e  c l e a r  g a i n  i n  c o g n i t i v i s m  i s  t h e  r e - m i n d i n g  
o f  a n i m a l s ,  a  c o m p e n s a t o r y  m o v e  n e c e s s i t a t e d  b y  t h e  
m i n d l e s s n e s s  o f b e h a v i o r i s m .  H o w e v e r ,  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
t h e  m i n d  i s  t a k e n  t o  m e a n  w o r k i n g  o u t  t h e  m e c h a n i s m s  
o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  s t o r a g e  a n d  p r o c e s s i n g .  H o w  t h i s  
p r o c e s s i n g  i s  e x p e r i e n c e d  b y  a n  a n i m a l  o r  e v e n  h o w  
o r  w h e t h e r  a n  a n i m a l  i s  a w a r e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
p r o c e s s e d  a r e  q u e s t i o n s  n o t  t y p i c a l l y  a d d r e s s e d  i n  a  
c o g n i t i v i s t  s t y l e  o f r e s e a r c h .  T h e r e  i s  a  s t r o n g ,  a l t h o u g h  
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often tacit, distinction between mind or mental life, 
refening to representation and informational capabilities, 
and consciousness, which refers to awareness. As the 
behaviorist investigator practiced forgetting mind, so does 
the cognitivist, mutatis mutandis, forget consciousness. 
Even those cognitivists who use the intentionalist 
explanatory style suggested by Dennett and talk of 
animals anticipating or planning do not mean to imply 
that their subjects are aware of their own plans. The 
animals are not having an experience of their own plans 
or of any other intention imputed to them. There is no 
question ofexperiencing, of world as lived, of umwelt. 
Given observations of certain behavior one can infer 
plans and planning. The basis for such talk rests, in turn, 
in theoretical talk of cognitive structures such as maps 
and of information processing. It is behavior as 
objectively observed that is explained. This move 
bypasses both description and explanation of an 
animal's lived world. 
Given the relative philosophical sophistication of 
its contributors, a virtue of the volume under review is 
that there is some recognition and discussion of the 
problematics of this absence (see Crisp, Akins and 
Dupre, all in section IV). Here I will not rehearse their 
arguments regarding the possibility of whether and how 
a science ofanimal behavior, having re-minded animals, 
might also give them back their awareness. Rather, in 
the remainder of this review I will discuss the 
implications of the fact that most of the substantive 
(more empirical) essays on particular animal 
phenomena eschew talk ofconsciousness. In particular, 
I will share my concerns about the ethical implications 
of this absence. (Note that the formal discussion of 
ethics occurs in the second volume of this anthology, 
which is not under review here). 
An enterprise that takes subjectivity as the object of 
its study does not promise that its animal subjects (in 
this context "subjects" may be, finally, actually taken 
as that) will be treated ethically. Any knowledge can be 
used to exploitative ends. On the other hand, as the study 
of the structure of prejudice shows, discrimination and 
exploitation are often based on and justified by highly 
external, partial (in both senses of that term), and rigidly 
stereotypical knowledge. Knowledge of individuals that 
is based on involvement with them, understanding in 
the etymological sense of that term (standing under) 
tends to dissolve such prejudicial thought and treatment. 
The reluctance to allow animals their subjectivity 
may be seen as yet another in a series ofreceding lines 
drawn for the sake of maintaining a radical cleavage 
between human and nonhuman animals. As I have 
argued elsewhere (Shapiro, 1990), historically such 
discreteness has provided fertile ground for positions 
that partake of that form of discrimination referred to 
as speciesism. Jonas (1966) argues on ontological 
grounds that the more compelling cleavage is between 
animals and plants. 
That animal/plant is a more acceptable cleavage on 
ethical grounds is clear also from a glance at the several 
emerging moral philosophical discourses on our 
treatment of animals. The refusal of the new science of 
animal behavior to give animals their world as lived costs 
each of these further empirical and conceptual support. 
In Singer's utilitarianism (1975), suffering of which an 
individual is somehow not aware; in Regan's deontology 
(1983), being the "subject of a life" that is not lived 
through or lived in; in Rollin's neo-Aristotleianism 
(1981), purpose that is not known; and in feminism's 
"relationship" (Adams, 1990), a r~lation that is not 
lived- all of these critical phenomena are thinner with­
out consideration of the consciousness of the individual. 
They all need the backing of a scientific discourse that is 
not wary of investigating the experience of pain and 
suffering, of living toward a certain end or purpose, of a 
certain form of relationship with another animal ... 
It is reasonable to speculate that if we had had such 
a contemporary phenomenology of the well-being of 
primates, the poor resolution of the regulations 
implementing that provision in the recent amendments 
of the Animal Welfare Act (1985) might have been 
averted. (Works by Goodall [1986] and Cheney and 
Seyfarth [1990], published after the passage of the 
legislation, are somewhat more open to attempting an 
account of primate subjectivity). 
Ethical Implications 
Any scientific enterprise involving research with 
animal subjects has ethical implications on at least three 
levels: ( 1) the direct treatment of the animals involved, 
(2) the investigatory posture of the inquirer, and (3) the 
substantive findings. The first has immediate ethical 
cost in terms of the pain, suffering and harm of the 
animal subjects. There have been some efforts to 
measure this through a concept ofinvasiveness (Shapiro 
and Field, 1988). The second, investigatory posture, 
affects (1) and (3), but, as importantly, it influences the 
general public's approach and attitude toward animals. 
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F o r  e x a m p l e ,  a n  i n v e s t i g a t o r y  p o s t u r e  t h a t  e m p h a s i z e s  
k n o w l e d g e  ( a n d  c o n t r o l )  g a i n e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  t h r o u g h  
i n s t r u m e n t a t i o n ,  m e a s u r e m e n t ,  a n d  i n f e r e n c e  m o d e l s  
a n  a t t i t u d e  o f  d i s t a n c e  b e t w e e n  h u m a n  a n d  a n i m a l .  I t  
i m p l i e s  r e m o t e n e s s  a n d  d e t a c h m e n t ,  w h i l e  a n  
i n v e s t i g a t o r y  p o s t u r e  t h a t  f e a t u r e s  i n v o l v e m e n t ,  
p a r t i c i p a t i o n ,  a n d  e m p a t h y  a s  a  m e a n s  o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
t e a c h e s  c a r i n g  ( C a v e ,  1 9 8 2 ) .  
S u b s t a n t i v e  f i n d i n g s  a n d ,  i n s e p a r a b l y ,  t h e  d i s c o u r s e  
i n  w h i c h  t h e y  a r e  c o u c h e d  a l s o  i n f l u e n c e  p u b l i c  
a t t i t u d e s .  O n e  o f  t h e  b e n e f i t s  o f  c o g n i t i v e  e t h o l o g y  i s  
t h e  w o n d e r f u l  c a p a b i l i t i e s  w h i c h  t h e y  h a v e  s h o w n  i n  
a n i m a l s .  B u t  t o  s a y  t h a t  a n  a n i m a l  c a n  r e p r e s e n t  
i n f o r m a t i o n  y e t ,  i n  t h e  p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l  s e n s e ,  i s  n o t  
p r e s e n t  t o  t h e  w o r l d  o f  w h i c h  h e  o r  s h e  i s  s o  i n f o r m e d  
i s  l i k e l y  t o  h a v e  a  r e d u c t i o n i s t i c  a n d  d i s t a n c i n g  e f f e c t  
o n  o u r  p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  a n i m a l s .  
I n  h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  s t a n c e ,  W i l d e r  
p o i n t s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  d a n g e r  t h a t  i t  m i g h t  p r o v i d e  m i s l e a d i n g  
a n d  " i n f l a t i o n a r y  a c c o u n t s "  ( p .  3 5 6 )  m a y  b e  o f f s e t  b y  
t h e  " f e c u n d [ i t y ] "  o f  t h e  l e a d s  s o  p r o v i d e d .  A s  M e n z e l  
a n d  J o h n s o n  ( 1 9 7 8 )  h a v e  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  i n  t h i s  e r a  o f  
c o n c e r n  a b o u t  t h e  e t h i c s  o f o u r  t r e a t m e n t  o f a n i m a l s ,  t h e r e  
i s  a n  e t h i c a l  g a i n  i n  e r r i n g  o n  t h e  s i d e  o f i n f l a t i o n  r a t h e r  
t h a n  r e d u c t i o n .  W h i l e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  o u r  i n t e n t  i s  t o  k n o w  
a n i m a l s  a s  t h e m s e l v e s ,  g i v e n  t h i s  c o n c e r n  i t  i s  a  b e t t e r  
w a g e r  t o  e r r  o n  t h e  s i d e  o f  a n t h r o p o m o r p h i s m  t h a n  
m e c h a n o m o r p h i s m .  C o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h i s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
s t u d y  o f  c o n s c i o u s n e s s  i n  a n i m a l  b e h a v i o r  s c i e n c e  w i l l  
y i e l d  b o t h  p r o d u c t i v e  l e a d s  a n d  e t h i c a l  g a i n s .  G i v e n  t h e  
s t r e n g t h  o f  c r i t i q u e s  f r o m  v a r i o u s  q u a r t e r s  o f  t h e  
p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  c e r t a i n t y  ( W i l d e r ,  p .  3 6 4 )  t h a t  w a s  t h e  
h a l l m a r k  o f p o s i t i v i s m ,  s u r e l y  a n i m a l  b e h a v i o r  s c i e n t i s t s  
c a n  r i s k  r e l a x i n g  t h e i r  p r e o c c u p a t i o n s  w i t h  v a l i d i t y  a n d  
f o r  r e d u c t i o n i s t i c  e x p l a n a t i o n s .  
C o n t e m p o r a r y  p h i l o s o p h y  o f s c i e n c e ,  d e v e l o p m e n t s  
i n  m o r a l  p h i l o s o p h y ,  a n d  t h e  n e w  a n i m a l  b e h a v i o r  
s c i e n c e  c a n  m e e t  a n d  c o m p l e m e n t  e a c h  o t h e r  i f  t h e  
l a t t e r ,  h a v i n g  m o v e d  f r o m  b e h a v i o r  t o  m e n t a l  l i f e ,  c a n  
m a k e  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  m o v e  f r o m  m e n t a l  l i f e  t o  
e x p e r i e n c e .  A  r i g o r o u s  s c i e n c e  o f  t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
a n i m a l s  i s  p o s s i b l e ,  f r u i t f u l ,  a n d  f a i r .  
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for Cognitive Ethology 

Dale Jamieson and Marc Bekoff 
University of Colorado 
In his excellent review of the frrst volume of our 
two-volume anthology, Interpretation and Explanation 
in the Study of Animal Behavior, Kenneth Shapiro 
provides a provocative account of the strengths and 
weaknesses of cognitive ethology. We would like to take 
this opportunity to highlight and extend some of 
Shapiro's points, and to explain more fully what we 
hope to accomplish in our work on cognitive ethology. 
One ofour motivations, like Shapiro's, is practical. 
Although there is no purely logical connection between 
views about mental continuity and views about moral 
continuity, we believe that there are important 
psychological connections. In our view, a culture which 
recognizes its behavioral and emotional kinship with 
nonhuman animals is one that is likely to recognize its 
moral kinship as well (Bekoff and Jamieson 1991; 
Wuensch et al. 1991; Rollin 1989). The moral case for 
changing our behavior with respect to nonhuman 
animals has been convincingly argued by many 
philosophers (see for example Singer 1990, Regan 1983, 
and Sapontzis 1987). We see our work in cognitive 
ethology in part as contributing to the epistemic 
infrastructure that will make such moral views more 
widely accepted. 
Our motivations are also theoretical. In the post-World 
War II period, especially in the United States, philosophy 
and biology have increa.<>ingly become estranged. Tomany 
biologists philosophy bas seemed irrelevant or even 
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